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INTRODUCTION 
Taxation is important, even crucial, for development. First, taxation is a significant – and for 
many countries, the only – sustainable source of state revenue. Second, taxation is 
considered to provide for more democratically accountable governments, which in turn is 
held to be conducive to political as well as economic development. The first argument is 
apparent. The second is more contested.  The notion that democratically accountable 
governments provide the foundation for development is not conclusively proven.  However, 
there seems to be a broad consensus in the development and democratisation literature on 
the need for developing countries to strengthen government accountability (World Bank 
1998, Bratton and van de Walle).  It is the link between taxation and accountability that is 
most contested.  Our concern here is not with processes of democratisation or the nature 
tax reform per se, but with the circumstances under which taxation provides for more 
democratically accountable governments. We focus on three interrelated issues affecting the 
relationship between taxation and accountability. First, we consider the internal 
accountability of the tax system and ask whether the reforms have resulted in a system of 
taxation with greater reach, higher level of efficiency and transparency. Second, we ask 
whether the tax reforms have created closer links between African governments and their 
citizens and thereby increased democratic accountability. Third, we discuss to what extent 
and in what ways external accountability relations between the governments and 
international donors affect domestic accountability relations.  
 
                                                 
1 This paper was written in connection with the research programme ‘Taxation, Aid and 
Democracy’ funded by the Norwegian Research Council and by Danida. 
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We discuss the relationship between taxation and accountability in the context of tax reforms 
currently undertaken in a number of sub-Saharan African countries, with particular reference 
to the reforms carried out in Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania in the 1990s as part of larger 
structural adjustment programmes. In the 1980s, Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania faced fiscal 
crises as the main revenue base – export taxes – declined or collapsed. Tax reforms were 
implemented as part of the economic restructuring agreements with the International Finance 
Institutions (IFIs). The creation of semi-autonomous revenue authorities was a central 
component of the reform process in all three countries.  In all three countries, these reforms 
resulted  – at least initially – in a substantial transformation of the tax base and increases in 
the ratios of tax revenue to GDP. However, the tax reforms appear only to a limited degree 
to have resulted in closer links between government and citizens and we do not find that they 
have provided the basis for more democratically accountable governments. One reason is 
that the tax reforms have not focussed on the forms of taxation most profoundly affecting the 
relationship between governments and citizens - direct taxes. Large sectors of the economy, 
most notably agriculture and the informal sector, remain outside the tax system. We argue 
that the tax authorities have focused on ‘easy taxes’, such as import taxes and the large 
formal businesses in order to satisfy donor demands for increased tax/GDP ratios. By 
contrast, the more sustainable, but administratively and politically complicated task of 
expanding the tax net has not taken place. As a result, a ‘tax culture’ appears to be lacking 
in all three countries. There is little reciprocity in the relationship between state and society 
and accountability mechanisms have not been strengthened to the degree predicted in the 
literature.  
 
THE LINKS BETWEEN TAXATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The notion of accountability used here has three components: transparency, answerability 
and controllability. Office-holders are fully accountable when: they exercise their powers in 
a way that is transparent, in the sense that it enables others to see whether all is done in 
accordance with the relevant rules and mandates; they are answerable in the sense of being 
obliged to provide reasons for their decisions and actions; and institutional checks or 
control mechanisms are in place to prevent mismanagement and abuse of power and 
ensure that corrective measures are taken in cases where the rules are violated. Democratic 
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accountability requires in addition institutional mechanisms through which ‘the people’ can 
punish (remove) officials who do not meet the standards, and influence laws and policy 
decisions. In the following we attempt to measure controllability in relation to the institutional 
mechanisms in place to control corruption in the new tax authorities. Answerability will be 
understood as the ability of the new agencies to act independently of government, thus, the 
extent to which they are answerable for their own decisions (Table 2). 
 
Taxation is believed to promote these qualities in public officials and institutions because this 
is necessary in order to make the population accept their tax obligations. If governments are 
perceived as accountable, more people will pay their taxes “voluntarily”, which lowers the 
need for coercion and generally reduces the costs of tax-collection (Levi 1988). Conversely, 
if people do not see their governments as accountable, there is an increased likelihood that 
state demands for (new or higher) taxes will be met with protest and violence that is costly 
and might even jeopardise the position of those in power. History provides numerous 
examples of democratic concessions granted in order to broaden the tax-base, and of tax-
payment being used as an explicit condition for citizens to qualify as a voter or candidate for 
office. This illustrates both a demand from taxpayers that if they are to contribute they should 
also have a say in how the money is used, and an acknowledgement from governments of 
the validity of this claim - whether for pragmatic reasons or on grounds of reasonableness. 
The link between taxation and accountability is typically illustrated by the battle cry from the 
American colonies’ fight for independence from Britain  - “no taxation without 
representation”.  
 
Based on Western experiences, one might expect that the recent processes of 
democratisation taking place in sub-Saharan Africa, coupled with economic reforms 
(hereunder tax reforms), would have a positive effect on revenue extraction. So far, 
however, there is little empirical evidence to support such expectations. Why is this so? One 
reason might be that the rationale for tax-collection is different in these countries. It may 
seem self-evident that the purpose of increasing revenue is to finance government 
expenditure and thus facilitate the provision of public services. But with donors playing a 
critical role in financing external debt service and development projects, the rationale for 
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increasing domestic revenue is not self evident. In sub-Saharan Africa, the primary objective 
of tax reform might rather be to fulfil criteria (conditionalities) set by the donors.  The 
structural adjustment processes, of which these tax reforms are a part, have generally limited 
the ability of the state to provide social services to their citizens. This may be an obstacle to 
the establishment a new culture of tax-paying. As argued by Luoga (2001: 15): “Citizens feel 
the burdens imposed by taxes more heavily in the current environment where government 
has withdrawn from providing social services”. While this paper focuses on the revenue side 
of the taxation-accountability relationship, it should be kept in mind that the expenditure 
side also plays a crucial role. Taxation can only be a reciprocal relationship between 
governments and taxpayers if the latter feel that they get a return in the form of services, 
infrastructure or security.  
 
Furthermore, the expected relationship between taxation and accountability is mainly 
relevant for certain forms of taxation: the revenue sources that are highly ‘visible’ or ’felt’ 
and thus directly link citizens to the state. These are primarily direct taxes (corporate and 
personal taxes).  Indirect taxes in the form of the Value Added Tax (VAT) tend to be broad 
in reach. While they may have a similar effect to direct taxes, it is likely to be much weaker. 
Particularly where they are relatively visible and 'felt' by large sections of the populations, 
indirect taxes may give rise to demands for something in return and a say in how the money 
is spent. The replacement of general sales taxes with VAT, which has taken place in many 
sub-Saharan countries as part of the economic restructuring, was intended to bring larger 
groups into the tax net. As we shall see, this has not really happened.  
 
Historically, direct forms of taxation have been limited in sub-Saharan Africa due to 
problems of information, taxable incomes, infrastructure and political sensitivity. Most 
African governments relied instead on  ‘easy taxes’ such as commodity exports and excise 
duties. But, in the late 1980s, after a series of external shocks, most African countries faced 
a deep fiscal crisis due to, among other factors, adverse terms of trade. The cases of 
Uganda and Zambia are illustrative. In Uganda the main revenue source basically collapsed 
with the demise of the International Coffee Agreement in the 1980s and the subsequent fall 
in coffee prices. In Zambia, the dramatic decline in world market prices on copper reduced 
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government revenue by half between 1975 and 1980. Increasingly, it was realised that the 
fiscal crisis was also a crisis of governance as the central state apparatuses in most 
countries of the region were plagued by political and institutional weaknesses that 
undermined their abilities to promote economic development, and collect revenue to sustain 
state activities. Thus, from the late 1980s, Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia, like most sub-
Saharan countries, have received substantial amounts of aid aimed at stimulating economic 
policy reform. In most cases, the structural adjustment agreements entered into with the IFIs 
have included tax reforms.  
 
For the purposes of the present analysis the primary aims of the tax reforms are, firstly, to 
increase the internal accountability and efficiency of the tax system. Strengthening this 
mechanism is seen as an important means to help achieve the broader goal of increasing 
democratic accountability between the government and the taxpaying voters. Unless 
potential taxpayers know that the tax system is reasonably efficient and trustworthy - that 
their neighbours are also likely to pay, and that the money will reach the relevant authorities - 
they are unlikely to pay up voluntarily, or to engage in political activity to influence the ways 
in which the money is used, thus institutionalising democratic practices and accountability 
relations.  
 
A factor that differentiates Africa’s political development from Europe’s is the role of the 
international donor community in shaping Africa’s development trajectories. A prominent 
feature in most African countries is that what initiates and keeps up momentum for the 
reforms is external pressure from donors and international lending institutions. External 
accountability between governments and donors (multilateral and bilateral) therefore plays 
a crucial role in initiating and driving the reforms by creating incentives structures and placing 
conditions on the recipient governments. Donors set standards regarding the internal 
operation of the tax system as well as the spending of tax and other revenue. External 
accountability relations between the governments and international donors may therefore 
affect domestic accountability relations. The relationship between these three forms of 
accountability is illustrated in figure 1. 
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Figure 1 app. here 
 
In this paper, we focus on each of these three accountability structures and the relations 
between them: 
1. With regard to the internal accountability of the tax system, we ask to what extent the 
reforms have succeeded in creating more efficient and trustworthy tax systems - 
transparent systems capable of ensuring that tax-money is not embezzled, and that those 
who should pay tax do in fact pay.  
2. We also ask whether the conditions are in place for taxation to have a positive effect on 
democratic accountability. Have reforms changed the nature of the tax system to the 
extent that taxes are being ‘felt’ by a majority of the population? And, if so, has this 
triggered a response in the form of demands for greater accountability by the citizens? 
Do we find evidence of governments more willing to be transparent, to justify their 
decisions in public, and be constrained by institutions representing the public will?  
3. We discuss whether external accountability aimed at strengthening domestic 
accountability structures through tax reforms have succeeded, or whether external 
accountability relations in fact hamper development of domestic structures for 
democratic accountability. 
 
 
THE INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF REFORMED TAX AUTHORITIES  
If the tax collection apparatus is inefficient, incompetent and corrupt, this is a strong 
disincentive for potential taxpayers. As part of the economic restructuring process, the 
international donor community has emphasised the virtue of independent revenue authorities. 
By placing the responsibility for revenue collection outside the civil service, the aim has been 
to bypass deficiencies in existing state institutions through higher salaries and more flexible 
procedures for hiring and firing employees. In Uganda, Tanzania and Zambia the new 
revenue authorities provided incentives, such as high quality training and higher salaries. The 
challenge facing the revenue authorities in all three cases was to raise the contribution of 
locally-raised revenue to the domestic budget from the very low levels prevailing in the 
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1980s. It was also necessary to restructure taxes away from export taxes to a tax system 
that could facilitate private sector growth. In all countries export taxes acted as a major 
disincentive for the agricultural sector and they were abolished in the early stages of reform.  
 
In terms of increased levels of efficiency in revenue collection, evaluations of the tax reforms 
in the three countries are generally positive, pointing to increased levels of administrative 
efficiency, greater compliance from formal sector tax payers, and a decreased levels of 
smuggling (Table 1)2. However, measured by the amount of revenue collected in relation to 
total GDP, the effectiveness of the tax reforms in all three countries presents a mixed picture. 
Uganda initially provided a striking success case. Total revenue rose from 7 per cent of 
GDP in the early 1990s to 12 per cent by 1999, a success coinciding with the establishment 
of Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991. However, the ratio has remained stagnant 
since 1995, suggesting that overall revenue performance has reached a plateau below the 
level needed to achieve fiscal sustainability. In Zambia the ratio of tax to GDP improved 
from 17.5 per cent to 18.5 after the creation of Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA)3. In 
Tanzania tax income increased from 11 per cent of GDP in 1995/96 to 12 per cent the year 
after, but the ratio has later dropped to 10 per cent, suggesting perhaps that the effects of 
the ‘agency model’ may be short-lived (Fjeldstad and Tungodden 2001).  
 
Table 1 app. here 
 
The tax base was narrow in all three countries prior to the reforms. Success in widening it 
would be an important indicator of their success from an accountability perspective. The 
record in all three countries is strikingly similar: the reforms so far have focused on increasing 
                                                 
2 For Zambia, see Harvey et al. (1996) and Gray, Shera and Condy (2001). For Tanzania, 
see Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2001), Rakner (2001), and Temu and Due (2000). For 
Uganda, see Obwona (2001) and  Gray, Karuga and Ssemegere (2001). 
3 However, due to a 2 per cent contraction of the Zambian economy between 1997-1999, 
the GDP/tax ratio is probably not an adequate reflection of the efficiency of the Zambian 
Revenue Authority (Gray, Shera and Condy 2001). 
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collection through improving the compliance of existing and known taxpayers. As a result, 
the tax bases remain narrow. In the case of Uganda, the growth in the number of taxpayers 
does not reflect the rather broad and rapid economic growth recorded in recent years. 
Similarly, the accounts from Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) indicate that more than 70 
per cent of taxes collected are consumption taxes. The regional distribution also points to a 
relatively limited tax net: close to 80 per cent of revenues come from the region of Dar es 
Salaam (Temu and Due 2000, Luoga 2001). In Zambia both the agricultural sector and the 
non-agricultural informal sector, which account for almost all the labour force, remain 
outside the tax net. As the Minister of Finance has continued to grant significant exemptions 
to corporations, the tax base in Zambia has remained exceedingly narrow. 
 
The way in which VAT has been introduced illustrates and helps explain the failure to widen 
the population base of the tax system. A uniform VAT (with major exemptions) has 
replaced business turnover taxes and sales tax in all three countries. However, as food 
commodities are zero rated for VAT and most agricultural inputs are exempted, VAT has 
not included many new groups into the tax system. The tax reforms have so far only to a 
limited extent involved the forms of revenue considered to affect state-citizen relations. 
 
An important aspect of internal accountability is the degree of transparency in the tax 
collection. Despite the creation of the semi-autonomous revenue authorities, with salary 
incentives and employment flexibility, evidence from Uganda, Zambia and Tanzania suggest 
that corruption remains a major problem. The close connection between the political elites 
and the executive directorship of the revenue authority is believed to be a major problem in 
Zambia (Gray, Shera and Condy 2001). In both Uganda and Tanzania, studies suggest a 
tendency of the fight against corruption to be undermined over time (Fjeldstad and 
Tungodden 2001; Gray, Karuga and Ssemogerere 2001; Obwona 2001). Based on survey 
data from their membership, the Uganda Manufacturing Association (UMA) claims that 
smuggling is increasing in Uganda and that up to 10 per cent of revenue is lost to smuggling 
(Obwona 2001). The government’s decision to employ the military to curb smuggling is 
hardly a sign of increased transparency in tax collection efforts. 
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The internal accountability dimension has only to a limited extent has been strengthened by 
the reform processes. While compliance from known taxpayers has been increased, the tax 
base remains narrow. Furthermore, studies and reports from all three countries suggest that 
the level of transparency and independence from the central government remain low (Table 
2). Have the tax reforms at all affected democratic accountability to the extent that the tax 
reforms have been ‘felt’ by any major groups in society?  
 
Table 2 app. here 
 
ASSESSING THE DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY EFFECT 
For taxation to provide the basis for democratic accountability several conditions must be in 
place. Firstly, a substantial part of the population must 'feel' the tax-burden. The 
inclusiveness of the tax-net and the visibility of the taxes are here of major importance. Next, 
structures and practices must be in place to provide for a reciprocal relationship between 
state and society, to allow articulation of demands for returns on the money, and changes in 
policy or leadership. 
 
The discussion above has revealed that so far the authorities in Uganda, Tanzania and 
Zambia have not succeeded in widening the tax base to any great extent. The attempts to do 
so – as part of the conditions set by the international donors – reveal that these reforms are 
administratively complex and politically sensitive. Since 1998 the Uganda Revenue Authority 
has been instructed to implement a Presumptive Income Tax on informal sector enterprises 
with low turnover. However, the process has been met with little enthusiasm in the Authority 
as the collection is not regarded as cost-effective and is politically sensitive (Gray, Karuga 
and Ssemogerere 2001; Anene and Garyio 2000). Similarly, the Zambian government has 
been pressurised by the donors to widen the tax base to include the informal sector. 
However, so far the measures undertaken have not been successful. As the large scale 
traders with political connections remain outside the tax net, the taxing of the small scale 
vendors is widely perceived as unfair (Gray, Shera and Condy 2001). The vendors also 
represent a political force the government wishes to placate and taxing them became an 
issue in the December 2001 electoral campaign.  
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But taxation is ‘felt’ by business  
According to available evidence the only group visibly affected by the central government 
tax reforms are the formal business corporations. In all three cases the revenue authorities 
have tended to target more effectively large taxpayers already in the net, rather than to 
widen the tax base. There is a widespread perception in the business community in all three 
countries that the revenue authorities have concentrated unduly on known corporate 
taxpayers. The effectiveness of the new institutions like Tanzania Revenue Authority with 
regard to this group is illustrated by studies conduced on the Tanzanian manufacturing 
sector. Until 1995, taxation was not an issue raised by manufacturers. Since 1996 it has 
become the main issue of concern because of the activities of the Revenue Authority.4 
Formal sector business is also the group most affected by the overlapping central and local 
government taxes in Tanzania (Luoga 2001). Similar studies conducted in Uganda and 
Zambia indicate that taxation is the primary complaint by the business community. The 
private sector in Zambia perceives Zambia Revenue Authority to focus its efforts on a small 
segment of the economy, which may have serious implications for sustainable revenue 
collection5.  Surveys of Ugandan firms reveal that high taxes, excessive levels of tax 
bureaucracy, ad hoc assessments, and audits are their major complaints (Obwona 2001: 
74). 
 
Corporate taxes in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia are not high by international standards. 
The complaints raised may stem from the fact that, as in most of sub-Saharan Africa, a tax 
paying culture is lacking. As argued by the former Director of the Board of Tanzania 
Revenue Authority “The problem is the transition of mindsets of people who are not used to 
                                                 
4 Personal communications, Hajih Semboja, member of Taxation Task Force, Dar es 
Salaam, 22/3 2001. 
5 Business confidence surveys carried out in Lusaka and on the Copperbelt confirm these 
perspectives. See M. Taylor and D. Aarnes (2002). 
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paying taxes, because 100 per cent profit is considered normal profit”6. Nevertheless, the 
perception by corporate business of the tax system as unfair is a major hindrance to the 
development of voluntary compliance and a level of trust between the tax authorities and the 
taxed. The frequent audits conducted by the Ugandan tax administration illustrate the lack of 
voluntary compliance and low level of mutual trust (Obwona 2001: 62). In extreme cases, 
as suggested by the Zambian case, differences in the actual treatment of formal and informal 
sector enterprises by tax authorities may create incentives for businesses to deregister to 
avoid taxation. 
  
While the tax reforms so far have drawn few new groups and individuals into the tax net, a 
voice and an organised response to the new revenue policies appear to be developing within 
the business community. In Uganda the implementation of VAT was initially met with strong 
resistance. Organised through Uganda Imports and Exports and Traders Association 
(UGIETA), the Ugandan traders launched a one-week strike in July 1996 to protest its 
implementation (Garyio 2000; Ssewakiryanga 2000). The immediate response of the 
authorities was to arrest traders, but eventually the matter was solved through a decrease in 
the number of firms eligible for VAT. In Tanzania, the tax grievances of large taxpayers are 
increasingly being taken to the legal system (Luoga 2001). Organisations like the Tanzania 
Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA) and Confederation of Tanzanian 
Industries (CTI), which represent large business, have also on a few occasions employed 
economic consultants and presented their grievances to the authorities. Twice the demands 
from the business community have resulted in changes of the existing tax laws (Rakner 
2001). The Tanzania Taxpayers Association (TATA) was recently established as a result of 
the growing awareness of the impact of taxation on business. In Uganda, the Uganda 
Manufacturing Association (UMA) is increasingly handling taxpayers' problems. The 
complaints from, among others, the business sector resulted in the creation of a Tax Appeals 
Tribunal within the Uganda Revenue Authority in 1998. While no similar agency has been 
                                                 
6 Interview, Benno Ndulu 28/3 2001, World Bank, Dar es Salaam, first Chairman of the 
Board of the Tanzanian Revenue Authority . 
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established in Zambia and Tanzania, the business sector has been invited as members of the 
Task Forces on Taxation. 
   
Formal business constitutes a small segment of society in these countries. These 
developments, nevertheless, indicate that the tax reforms have resulted in some new 
demands on these governments, potentially creating new accountability structures. But how 
are the governments responding? In all three countries business complains that, so far, the 
consultation taking place is neither transparent nor effective. Furthermore, studies from both 
Tanzania (Luoga 2001) and Uganda (Anene and Gariyo 2001) point to the limited trust 
between the tax administration and the public, to the excessive imbalance in the taxpayer tax 
authority relations, and to the lack of efficient safeguards against misuse and abuse of power. 
Despite efforts to increase customer care and services, the tax system in all three countries 
still appears adversely affected by lack of trust that again manifests itself in low levels of 
voluntary compliance. In part, this is due to the external accountability dimension of tax 
reforms in sub-Saharan Africa. So far, the need to satisfy donor conditionality for increased 
tax/GDP ratios appear to have weighed more heavily on the Ugandan, Tanzanian and 
Zambian authorities than any concern about building a voluntary tax relationship with its own 
citizens.  
 
EXTERNAL DONOR ACCOUNTABILITY  
From the development literature there are many well-known cases to support the claim that 
governments that do not depend on tax revenue as a significant part of their income, tend not 
to develop strong structures of democratic accountability. The low propensity of rentier 
states – deriving the bulk of state revenue from natural resource extraction (oil, minerals) – 
to democratise and consolidate their democracies is well documented (Moore 1998)7. And 
the main reason seems to be that the easily extracted rent eliminates (or substantially lowers) 
the need to trade democratic representation and accountability for tax revenue. It is 
increasingly acknowledged that similar dynamics tend to operate in states where the 
                                                 
7 Note also the contributions of Therkildsen, Fjeldstad, and Hlope and Friedman to this 
Bulletin. 
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government depends on foreign aid and loans for the bulk of their budgets. And when 
donor-funding increases this seems to have an adverse affect on tax collection.  
 
There is, however a difference between donor dependent and rentiér states (Therkildsen, in 
this volume). As the discussion above has revealed, for aid dependent countries external 
agencies – donors and international lending institutions – have increasingly demanded 
accountability from the government, by imposing direct and indirect conditionalities. From a 
donor perspective, where good (accountable) government is high on the agenda, to 
strengthen the domestic tax-base has become a major issue in order to weaken the 
dependence on foreign aid and to make governments more accountable. With aid 
increasingly being conditional and with tax reform part of the conditionality agenda, aid and 
taxation may be positively related. But is this so? There are as we have seen indications that 
it might not be so easy to introduce democratic accountability through externally imposed tax 
reforms. 
 
The tax reforms carried out in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia have to a large extent been 
formulated and imposed by the international donor community. In all three countries, the 
IMF has maintained a lead role in advising government on major issues of design of tax 
policies. To meet the targets set by the IMF and Ministry of Finance, the revenue authorities 
have focussed on increasing collection and compliance from existing taxpayers rather than 
attempting the more complicated task of widening the tax base. The long-term process of 
building wide tax nets and cultures of voluntary compliance requires different and more time-
consuming practises. These processes are also politically more sensitive, as the resistance to 
taxing agriculture in Uganda and Zambia indicates.  
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Table 1. Nature of tax reform in the 1990s 
 
Form of 
taxation 
Expected 
accountability 
effect 
Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
Direct taxes 
(Personal 
income tax, 
Corporation  
tax) 
Visible, ‘felt’ 
taxes – 
positive  
accountability 
effect 
Little change. 
Collection 
targeted on 
business 
corporations 
New Income 
Tax act; 
increased 
compliance; but 
little emphasis 
on informal 
sector; business 
targeted 
Little change. 
Limited to 
formal sector; 
major 
exemptions 
granted large 
corporations 
Indirect taxes Less visible,  
narrow reach 
- less clear 
accountability 
effect  
57% total 
revenue* 
 82.5 total 
revenue** 
61% total 
revenue*** 
 Export taxes  Eliminated  Eliminated Eliminated 
 Import taxes  Replaced 
export taxes 
Replaced 
export taxes 
Replaced 
export taxes 
 Excise duties  Little change Increases Little change 
 VAT Visible, ‘felt’ 
taxes with 
broad reach – 
positive  
accountability 
effect 
VAT introduced 
in 1998, but 
most basic 
goods 
exempted; 
narrow reach 
VAT introduced 
in 1996 at 17%. 
Initial strikes 
and riots by 
business. 
Agriculture and 
basic goods 
exempted 
VAT introduced 
in 1995 at 
17.5%. 
Agriculture and 
basic goods 
exempted; 
narrow reach 
Local taxes Visible, ‘felt’ 
taxes with 
broad reach – 
positive  
accountability 
effect 
Local 
‘development 
levy’ ‘felt’ by 
majority. Little 
voluntary 
compliance. 
Duplication of 
central and local 
taxes 
Local 
‘graduated tax’ 
‘felt by 
majority’. No 
voluntary 
compliance 
Hardly any local 
taxes; local 
govt. weak 
*1997/98 Financial year, source: TRA Annual Report ** 1998/99 Financial year, Annual 
Background to Budget. Republic of Uganda *** 1997/98 Financial year, Ministry of 
Finance, Republic of Zambia 
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Table 2. Reform of tax administration in the 1990s 
 
Reform of tax 
administration  
Expected effect on 
accountability 
Tanzania Uganda Zambia 
New Revenue 
Authority 
Positive - 
depending on internal 
accountability 
TRA 1995, initial 
increase in 
tax/GDP from 
11.5 to 12.5 % 
but now reduced 
to 10  
URA 1991, 
increase tax/GDP 
from 7 to 12 
between 1991-95, 
has remained stable 
at 12 % of GDP 
ZRA 1994, 
tax/GDP 
increase from 
17.5 to 18.5 
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Figure 1: Three dimensions of accountability 
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